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Biomarkers and brains: situating dementia in the
laboratory and in the memory clinic
Joanna Latimer a* and Alexandra Hillmanb
aScience & Technology Studies Unit, Sociology, University of York, York, UK; bSchool of
Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
This paper provides a comparison of how genetic biomarkers are used (or not)
in three contexts: clinic-based diagnostic work with people; lab-based research
on mice and their marbles; and lab-based research on thrashing nematodes. For
all the worldwide drive to ﬁnd biomarkers that can be used in the detection of
early, presymptomatic dementia, there is little research on how or when the
association between biomarkers and a deﬁnitive disease are being made to
“hold.” First, we show the disjuncture between the animal modeling that
underpins laboratory attempts to stabilize genetic biomarkers and the
paradigms that inform clinical diagnosis. Secondly, we develop this theme to
show how in our third site, an epigenetics “worm” laboratory,
neurodegenerative changes are explored as located in speciﬁc gene-
environment interactions over time. We speculate whether such an enactment
brings us closer to a notion of “situated biology,” to undercut possibilities of
making genetic biomarkers of preclinical dementia hold.
Keywords: animal models; biogerontology; mindedness; dementia; memory
clinics; epigenetics
Introduction
There is an ongoing challenge for biomedicine to ﬁrm up biomarkers that can be
used in the early detection of dementia (King 2018). These are best described as
genetic biomarkers which can be used to identify those people at greatest risk of
becoming demented in the future. Contemporary policy dictates that meeting this
challenge is paramount if the quest for the early detection, risk prediction and pre-
vention of dementias are to prosper. Yet problems arise when dementia science
seeks to establish biomarkers that can be used presymptomatically. This is not
just because they may result in misidentifying people as at risk (Milne et al.
2018), but also that they rely on a relatively stable association between the bio-
markers and a discrete disease. In contrast, a post-mortem examination has
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shown that even where the “soma” displays biomarkers of Alzheimer’s disease and
other dementias (ADAD), there may be no clinical history of dementia (Leibing
2016). The reasons for why these discrepancies occur are complex and pertain to
how dementia etiology and classiﬁcation is being conceived and researched.
By “stabilizing dementia” we are addressing the extent to which the category
“dementia” can be “made to hold” (Latour 1987) as an association between
genetic biomarkers and a discrete, identiﬁable disease. The point is that this stab-
ility is required in order that the biomarkers can be used in the diagnosis of demen-
tia prior to its clinical expression. Our concern is whether this stability can only be
achieved by excluding contextual issues of great importance. Speciﬁcally, the
growing critique around dementia science suggests that what is made absent
from research that seeks to stabilize dementia biomarkers, especially those that
can be used pre-symptomatically, is the minded, embedded and embodied
human subject. For example, social scientists such as Lock (2014), Moser
(2011), and Williams, Katz, and Martin (2011) question how a neuroscientiﬁc
culture is somaticizing dementia: that is, making mind a matter of body, speciﬁcally
the brain, in ways that relocate thinking, consciousness and even subjectivity as a
matter of “cognition” and neurobiological substance (Hillman and Latimer 2019;
Moser 2011).
Human mindedness can be understood not simply in terms of cognition, or brain
matter, but in terms of consciousness and conscience, including the capacity to
reason, think, feel, will, perceive, judge, sense and make sense. As such, minded-
ness is understood to be irreducible to neural substance or activity (the brain)
(Gabriel 2017). Cromby (2015) puts his ﬁnger on what is at stake here:
At stake is the so-called “hard problem” of how physical processes in the body and
brain can give rise to conscious experiences .... A collaborative analysis between a
neuroscientist and a philosopher (Bennett and Hacker 2003) shows how in neuro-
science this problem is frequently managed (in the sense of being concealed or
bypassed, rather than solved) by simply treating the mind as though it were equivalent
to the brain. (13)
As Cromby goes on to emphasize, Bennet and Hacker argue that these processes
are mistaken since these processes can only logically be attributed to persons,
not to “isolated parts.”
Moreover, social studies of dementia science increasingly also press for biologi-
cal research aimed at identifying and stabilizing dementia biomarkers to give
greater recognition of the subject whose mindedness is relational, located and con-
tingent. Here, Lock (2014) has spoken of the need for a “local biology” that recog-
nizes the contingent nature of how a body becomes visible as losing its mind as
much, much more than a matter of how genes mutate or not. Niewöhner (2011)
extending Lock’s notion of local biology, explores the signiﬁcance of how epige-
netics gets beyond the material basis of bodies and diseases as genetically deter-
mined, to reimagine the material basis of bodies as an effect of gene–
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environment interactions. Noting, however, that the laboratory enacts the environ-
ment as natural forces, Niewöhner argues for biology to take account of how bodies
are embedded in socio-political, as well as natural environments, and presses atten-
tion to “biography” and “milieu” in the production of the material basis of bodies.
In a more recent paper, Niewöhner and Lock (2018), drawing on Haraway’s (1988)
notion of situated knowledges, press for research that can produce “situated biolo-
gies,” especially how “different forms of ‘local’ arise in environment/human entan-
glements,” and “how material agency becomes situated and contingent through
various knowledge practices” (681).
We enter this debate by exploring how different locations enact dementia – par-
ticularly across the divide between human and non-human animals. Speciﬁcally,
we compare and contrast how biomarkers are used across three contexts in
which dementia is being enacted: clinic-based diagnostic work with people, lab-
based research on mice and their marbles; and lab-based research on thrashing
nematodes. Reﬂecting upon the alignments and tensions between these three enact-
ments is especially important in the context of drives for biomarkers that can be
used to stabilize dementia presymptomatically (Prince, Bryce, and Ferri 2011).
This is because of the complexity of how research that stabilizes biomarkers
does or does not take account of the situated and minded subject. In this respect,
we attend closely to what is made absent by some practices and yet present by
others (Woolgar and Lezaun 2013) in attempts to make dementia hold.
In pursuit of biomarkers
The dominant hypothesis in dementia science determines ADAD as neurodegen-
erative, progressive pathologies that make themselves known over time, and that
follows a linear trajectory. This theorization suggests that by the time ADAD
makes itself present as clinical symptoms it is already too late to do anything
about it (Aronowitz 2009). However, while a clinical diagnosis may be too late
to reverse the disease, it may be possible to ameliorate its effects, since dementia
emerges in the dementia science literature as more of a multiple (Mol 2002) than
this hypothesis suggests. For example, there are (at least) two possible theories
here: a notion that ADAD’s are different disease entities, along a spectrum
perhaps, but with their own taxonomies; or of a “dementia continuum,” a syndrome
(Fox et al. 2013), that is a “dimensional (lying along a continuum)” rather than a
“categorical (representing a distinct entity)” construct (Walter 2010, 534). In
addition, for some, the etiology that has come to predominate dementia science
is the amyloid or “pathological cascade” hypothesis (Karran, Mercken, and De
Strooper 2011) that also indicates ADAD happens over time and starts years
before someone can be said to have dementia; while for others, dementia
remains deeply correlated with growing old and with, for example, cardio-vascular
change, that can be prevented through lifestyle activities (Leibing 2019; Livingston
et al. 2017). Both constructions of dementia in their different ways have the
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possibility of shifting dementia from being a problem of old age to a problem of
ageing, one that can be known and managed and even eventually treated (Perry,
Zhu, and Smith 2013).
While dementia science recognizes the existence of multiple dementias, each
seems to press the case for a “predictive” biomedicine, characterized by discourses
of prevention, risk and uncertainty (Gottweis 2005). While the continuum hypoth-
esis, for example, helps trouble the premise that ADAD is just a natural conse-
quence of getting old, thereby troubling the ageism inherent to clinical medicine
(Oliver 2008), the hypothesis also gets scaled up in “apocalyptic” (Robertson
1991) predictions over population ageing, and the costs of Alzheimer’s disease
(AD) and dementia (see e.g. Alzheimer’s Disease International 2015). Speciﬁcally,
an emergent “actor-network” of dementia science, at the interface with biomedicine
and public health (Latimer 2018) constructs dementia as multiple, while at the same
time helps create a strategy of early detection and predictive technologies that can
identify people at risk of ADAD before they become symptomatic (Bloom 2014;
Milne 2016; Moreira, May, and Bond 2009; Swallow 2016).
To meet the pressure for early detection strategies there has been an emphasis on
research that can identify bioclinical entities that cross between the clinic and the
laboratory, such as mild cognitive impairment (MCI) (Moreira, May, and Bond
2009). Bioclinical entities are hybrid platforms through which the laboratory and
the clinic are bridged to help stabilize a diagnostic category. Moreira et al.’s
model of a bioclinical entity such as MCI stresses the intersection of the laboratory,
the clinic, industry and mechanisms of regulation in networks of interdependence.
But in the context of early detection of dementia, as discussed above, there is
increasing pressure for bioclinical entities that can be used to identify those at
risk of dementia before they become even mildly clinically symptomatic. Speciﬁ-
cally, the emphasis is on establishing biomarkers of dementia as bioclinical entities
that can help stabilize preclinical dementia.
Leibing (2016) suggests that biomarkers of dementia have changed little
between 1993 and 2013. She identiﬁes the main diagnostic biomarkers associated
with dementia as genes (such as ApoE4), Amyloid and Tau proteins (present in, for
example, cerebrospinal ﬂuid, as well as plaques and tangles in the brain) and brain
atrophy, visible on the new generation of MRI and PET scans (Leibing 2016, 46).
Leibing suggests that these biomarkers are there to support diagnosis, and that they
have failed to reach enough strength or speciﬁcity to be deﬁnitive on their own.
However, these biomarkers, as Boenink (2016) suggests, to have predictive
value (however stochastic or probabilistic) need to have their associations with
clinical symptoms validated. Moreover, because biomarkers seem to create
further opportunities for uncertainty and the need for interpretation over the differ-
ence between susceptibility and risk (see also Lock and Hedgecoe 2009) questions
arise as to how they are to be made stable enough in the diagnosis of preclinical
dementia. Which brings us back to the debate over how biomarkers are being vali-
dated for use in the early detection of dementia somaticize dementia.
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In addition to examining how biomarkers of dementia are used in the laboratory
in research using animal models, we also examine how biomarkers are used in the
clinic. In what follows, we explore the different ways in which the association
between biomarkers and dementia is deployed in the laboratory and in the clinic.
Speciﬁcally, in respect of the taken for granted need to stabilize the association,
we explore what is included and what is excluded for the association to hold.
Hence we do not assume these inclusions and exclusions to simply represent
“short-cuts” to irresponsible innovation (Leibing 2016). Rather, our concern in
this paper is to explore why genetic biomarkers alone may not be stable enough
to, as Leibing puts it, reach enough strength or speciﬁcity to be deﬁnitive in the
early detection of preclinical dementia in humans.
The studies
In the paper, we juxtapose our ethnography of memory clinics, funded by TheWell-
come Trust, with our research on biology and ageing funded by the ESRC and Lati-
mer’s current institution.
Fieldwork undertaken by Hillman in memory clinics based in two large Regional
National Health Service hospitals attached to Medical Schools in the UK, was
carried out between 2012 and 2014. While memory clinics were well established
as part of secondary medical services specializing in older people for some time,
they have expanded in line with pressure from governments and public health
policy for early detection technologies, discussed above, with the aim of diagnos-
ing people at risk of developing dementia. Our two clinics are both representative
of hospital-based memory services across the UK and each functioned in similar
ways, namely assessing patients experiencing problems with thinking and
memory. The ﬁeldwork involved the audio recording and the taking of ethno-
graphic ﬁeldnotes of clinical consultations (N = 51) and interviews with 13
memory clinic staff, 21 patients, 19 relatives/carers. The directors of the 2
memory clinic research sites were also active in dementia science, and identiﬁed
as having international inﬂuence in the ﬁeld. Additionally, Hillman identiﬁed 10
further dementia scientists from the research and clinical practice networks of
the 2 directors, all UK-based, for participation in interviews. Their areas of exper-
tise included: public health, genetics, psychiatric genetics, base biology, clinical
trials and a combination of these. Half of those in the sample were also clinically
active in dementia diagnosis and treatment alongside their research practice.
They were all, like the two directors, part of international collaborative networks
in Europe and worldwide, including large studies that brought different specialisms
together. Henceforth we refer to those participants in our study that were active
clinically and as scientists “clinician-scientists.”
Alongside the memory clinic study, we draw on the analysis of animal models of
ADAD used in two laboratory experiments. Since 1995 transgenic mice and other
animal models of different forms of ADAD are a common feature of basic research
New Genetics and Society 5
in neurobiology, particularly in relation to the identiﬁcation of those genetic
mutations associated with different forms of dementia. More recently there has
been pressure for the models to be developed that can help identify biomarkers
of presymptomatic dementia (King 2018). Our examples draw on Latimer’s
extended ethnography of biology and ageing (2009–2017) (Latimer 2018, 2019),
which has included site visits, interviews and extended conversations with over
30 scientists across the UK and US investigating the biology of ageing and associ-
ated diseases, as well as analysis of publicly available representations of animal
model research on ageing, and most recently two years of participant observation
of scientists working on ageing at a prestigious UK Life Sciences Institute.
For both ethnographies, analysis began in the ﬁeld where interpretations were
shaped and informed by ongoing relationships. Memory clinic consultations
were audio recorded and transcribed, ﬁeldnotes from all sites were written up
immediately following periods of observation. These texts were collated and ana-
lyzed for the various ways in which ADAD were being enacted, in order to identify
key themes. These were compared both within and across the different ﬁeld sites. In
the memory clinic study, key themes were reﬂected in the assessment and diagnosis
of those who were in the early stages or at risk of dementia as well as those with
established dementia. In the laboratory-based study, how etiologies of neurodegen-
eration and ageing were being researched and accounted for were identiﬁed and
analyzed for the different ways in which they use biomarkers and enact dementia,
as, for example, universal, genetically determined effects, or as situated, localized
and speciﬁc. We have chosen extracts from our ﬁeldwork that represent identiﬁed
key themes from the wider body of ethnographic material.
Making dementia hold in the clinic
Biomarkers are enacted in the clinical context as “provisional” rather than deﬁnitive
(Biomarkers Deﬁnitions Working Group 2001), with their signiﬁcance needing to
be grounded. Indeed, in the memory clinics we studied, genetic biomarkers such as
those described by Leibing above, are not used in the diagnostic process, although
the same clinician–scientists as we saw working in the clinic may use them in their
laboratory-based research. Rather, our clinician–scientists made stark distinctions
between the role of biomarkers in research, for identifying those at risk of future
dementia, and the drive to ﬁrm up the connections between biomarkers and symp-
tomatic expression of diseases causing dementia, and their reliability to give cre-
dence and a greater degree of certainty to a diagnostic label in the clinic. For
example,
Alex Hillman (AH): [what] I haven’t managed to get my head around is the changes
that you can see, like you were saying about amyloid changes through imaging and
things. But how that relates to symptoms experienced and…
Clinician-scientist: Amyloid doesn’t particularly at all. So, we know from ﬁxed
studies that you can have a lot of amyloid in the brain but you can be completely
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cognitively normal. So, it’s just not speciﬁc enough. I mean the brain imaging is an
interesting one because again, I mean I always go on the clinical picture rather than a
brain image. So, I’ve had - again you get second opinions. I’ve been asked to see
somebody who the clinician wants to say they’ve got dementia based on their
scan. The scan is showing the brain atrophy which is compatible with a diagnosis
of Alzheimer’s. But then when you look at and talk to the patient and you
examine the patient technically, and do cognitive tests they are brighter than you
are. They are absolutely totally switched on. There is nothing wrong in any way or
form you could pick up… … So people, that’s why I’m a little bit negative about
any biomarkers because ultimately even on land, I mean if you look at that scan in
isolation you can totally see why the clinician would say, that person looks to have
dementia. They haven’t. They haven’t and that’s the bottom line.
In this extract, the clinician–scientist warns against the utilization of biomarkers in
isolation, biomarkers which can stand in direct contradiction to the “real world”
patient they see in front of them. In medicine, and particularly in the context of
ADAD, clinical judgement, and the reading of the patient, takes precedence over
individual tests, scans or biomarkers. If the patient is not “dementing,” they
don’t have dementia “and that’s the bottom line.”
This “bottom line” however sits uncomfortably alongside a research agenda in
which risk proﬁling for dementia is being championed through the ﬁrming up of
biomarkers as having some predictive value. That is not to say that the biological
is entirely absent in the context of clinical diagnosis of dementia. It is rather that
making associations between the biological and the symptomatic is complex.
The biomarkers of interest in the clinical context involve Computerized Tomogra-
phy (CT) scanning of the brain, which are read to identify any atrophy, and the
areas of the brain which may be affected by it, and blood tests, mainly undertaken
as a means of excluding other potential causes of a patient’s presenting problem.
Alongside these diagnostic tests, clinicians take a detailed patient history from
patients themselves and often from their relative or carer who has been asked to
attend with them.
The patient history is interpreted together with cognitive tests, commonly under-
taken in a separate adjoining room by a psychologist or nurse practitioner but some-
times carried out by the doctor or psychiatrist as part of the consultation. The
cognitive tests are designed to test particular aspects of thinking associated with
dementia including memory recall, perception and orientation and word ﬁnding/
aphasia which are often made to connect to different parts of the brain – something
that can later be ﬁtted to the CT scan of the brain. As the extract above makes clear,
the biological markers are of little signiﬁcance in and of themselves, without the
patient history and cognitive tests to give them form and meaning.
The clinical context, therefore, requires a substantial degree of interpretive work
to bring together and assign signiﬁcance to the various pieces of the puzzle that help
to articulate dementia diagnostically. However, clinicians also engage patients and
their carers in extensive interactions over the meanings and signiﬁcance of these
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histories and of the tests (Hillman and Latimer 2019). Indeed, patients are brought
into play in interactions in the clinic as subjects who are situated in biography and
milieu, but also as having the capacity to reason, think, feel, will, perceive, judge,
sense and make sense. As one clinician explains, even the cognitive tests are limited
in their capacity to steer a diagnosis, without their relationship to good clinical
history, often including a “collateral history,” of what is happening in a patient’s
life being established:
Well I think the main sort of point to start with assessing people with dementia is deﬁ-
nitely to get a history rather than go straight for a memory test. So, a history that you
can have in part, partly from the patient but it’s very important to get some sort of
collateral history from a person who knows the patient very well. So, normally
yes, we ask when we send the referral, the appointment letter you know if it’s possible
to come with a person, a carer, a spouse, or a friend or whoever, that knows you well,
to be able to give a collateral history because of the nature of the condition. Some
patients even are in complete denial of having any problems. So that’s probably
the most important part of the assessment is to have a good history of events. And
then you go to do some proper cognitive assessment which mainly sort of normally
reﬂects what is happening in real life. (Memory Clinic Consultant)
Here the clinician describes what they see as the key aspect of building a dementia
diagnosis, assigning the cognitive assessments and other kinds of tests and markers
as secondary to the gathering of good history.
The tests become useful as a conﬁrmation of “real life” as it is presented through
the course of clinic interactions. The clinician speaks of the patient as a person who
can give a history but also as someone whose history needs to be conﬁrmed by
someone else – both patient and family member are brought into play as thinking,
knowing subjects – people who can be “known well,” or who can be “in denial.”
Cognitive scores are described as the best mechanism through which to connect the
biological to the experiential. On the one hand, aspects of the thinking that are
shown to be impaired through the test scores can be made to connect to the
brain scan – showing the parts of the brain likely to be affected and thus producing
the particular impairment evidenced through the test. On the other hand, the test can
be connected to the experiences that patients and families describe, such as not
being able to ﬁnd the right words or the names of things or people. However,
the cognitive score, as with the brain scan, can also be treated provisionally in
the memory clinic as a tool requiring interpretation according to the “reading”
(Atkinson 1995) of the individual patient and their family as minded and as
situated:
Some people in earlier stages that clearly have the deterioration in cognitive function
is starting to have some impact on everyday functioning. And you will say, sort of say
that “yes, deﬁnitely sort of early stages of dementia.” Sometimes it doesn’t translate
on the formal cognitive assessment and people do very well. People with a good level
of education and ability can score within normal limits you know for some time. So
that’s why the history is so important. (Memory Clinic Consultant)
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Here, social concerns including the level of education, are made central to practices
of clinical judgement that are drawn upon to mediate and nuance interpretation of
formal tests, including the cognitive test score. Like much medical sociology has
shown, clinical tests are mechanisms through which to ascribe signiﬁcance to or
challenge patient disposal (Berg 1992). This is particularly prescient in the case
of ADAD, where the tests and biomarkers of disease carry so much uncertainty
and thus require a greater degree of interpretative work to connect them to the pres-
entation of the symptomatic expressions of illness (Whitehouse, Frisoni, and Post
2004).
We saw across all our observations of interactions in the clinic that patients and
their family are indeed engaged in creating a picture of the patient – they are
engaged as subjects with the ability to know, make sense, represent. Critically,
interpretation of biological markers, as well as cognitive scores, are situated, in
and by the making of histories through interactions. Thus, through the taking of his-
tories and the interactions in the clinic, the patient and their family are engaged as
minded subjects, who can recall, reﬂect, understand, feel. Diagnosis is thus best
understood as an “event” through which dementia is or is not made stable: an
event that brings us closer to calls for locating dementia as pertaining to minded,
situated and embodied subjects.
Dementia, animal models and hypothetical pathways
As already discussed, there is increasing interest in identifying biomarkers that can
signify dementia prior to the development of any symptoms, to enable, as this clin-
ician-scientist puts it, early intervention:
I mean it’s all based on the hypothesis that actually, and it may not be true, but it may
be too late once the disease is well advanced. And our only hope really is around very
early intervention. That’s where the smart money seems to be moving, towards very
early intervention. (Clinician-scientist)
However, the logic here around persons having dementia runs conversely to that
which was advocated by clinicians in the previous section. Rather, the aim, as
another clinician-scientist put it to us, is for the people taking part in his research
to be deﬁned as having AD even though they are symptomless:
People in the project will have Alzheimer’s Disease- by deﬁnition- they’ll be bio-
marker positive, they’ll have evidence of amyloid and tau on their brain but they
don’t have dementia. We’re trying to prevent dementia.
The aim of contemporary research according to this clinician-scientist is that
humans need to display evidence of dementia as biomarkers, and even display
some morphological changes to, for example, the brain, but they do not need to
display any clinical symptoms in order to “have” the disease. Doing this in
humans is problematic because, to quote another participant, longitudinal studies
in humans that ﬁrm up the associations between the biomarkers and development
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of symptoms “run for decades” and there is a need now for drugs that can effect AD
before a person becomes cognitively impaired.1
Laboratory experiments using animal models of ADAD are being sought that
can help to ﬁrm-up the association between genetic biomarkers and identiﬁable
symptoms (King 2018) that do not “run for decades.” For example, transgenic
mouse models are used across dementia science research (Perry, Zhu, and Smith
2013), one of which was developed in a molecular biology laboratory at the
Max Plank Institute in Hamburg.2 The mouse’s genes have been made to “repli-
cate” AD by being genetically modiﬁed to “have” the human tau gene, and exper-
iments that result in defective phosphorylation of tau and accumulation of
neuroﬁbrillatory tangles. This model is aimed at enabling researchers to investigate
cognition and behavior (aspects of the phenotype) in relation to the genotype and its
expression in the mice. Controls – the “normal” wild type mice – systematically
bury marbles in their bedding. In contrast, the transgenic AD mice are disorganized
and unsystematic – they cannot bury marbles in an ordered way but just rummage
around in their bedding. This inability to bury marbles is taken as evidence of loss
of cognitive function: in other words the experiment associates “symptoms” in
mice with the presence of the genetic biomarkers of AD (the defective human
tau gene). The scientists succeeded in demonstrating that once the defective tau-
gene is deactivated, transgenic mice, which previously presented symptoms of
dementia, regain their cognitive abilities. This raises the possibility for the scientists
of whether medicines can be developed which similarly can both deactivate the
defective Human tau gene and do so prior to irreversible cognitive damage.
In this example, cognition is constructed as a function of genetic material that
activates/deactivates biological processes in the brain and which in turn are associ-
ated with symptoms of dementia. This requires the blackboxing of long chains of
translation (Latour 1987): such as those connecting AD- type dementia with tau
proteins through experiments with transgenic mice modiﬁed to “have” the
human tau gene; and the “effort,” as Rheinberger (2010) calls it, that goes into
the experimental system that it helps to generate (Davies 2012). Through this black-
boxing, biomarkers of AD (the defective human tau gene) can come into view, for a
moment at least, as stable entities, and even eventually as predictive of the risk of
dementia. Notably, the cognitive dysfunction that tau produces in mice is observed
through changes in their behavior – that the transgenic mice who have the human
tau gene are unable to systematically bury marbles as they would “normally” is for
all intents and purposes a symptom. Here then the mouse as a surrogate patient
(Lewis et al. 2013) helps ﬁrm up the association between the biomarkers and clini-
cal symptoms of cognitive decline. What is enacted is a neurocognitive mechanism
that produces a relation between genotype and phenotype, but what is made absent
by this enactment is a situated, minded subject: the mouse is not attributed with the
capacity to think, nor are they situated as a social, embodied subject, indeed the
social life of the mouse is of no interest to the experiment.
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In the Max Plank Institute experiment, making dementia hold as an association
between genetic biomarkers and symptoms appears relatively straightforward.
Aspects of organic material in the mice’s brain is made to represent dementia
and the symptoms of neurological dysfunction (the inability to bury marbles in
an organized way) provide the evidence for the effects of the defective Human
Tau gene. The lifespan of the mouse (2 years maximum) truncates the need to
trace the relationship between biomarkers and the progression of dementia over
time. A degree of simplicity that is severely lacking in human subjects. What is
also made absent is any sense of the mice as either minded or situated subjects –
on the contrary, it is the defective genes which are attributed with the material
agency to affect cognition and behavior, although the pathology can be reversed
through reengineering the mouse’s genetic makeup.
Gene expression, plasticity and variation
Next, we present research in the biosciences of ageing which focusses on epigenetic
biological processes, and which associates particular genes with signs and symp-
toms of neurodegeneration in nematode worms. For bioscientists interested in
ageing, neurodegeneration may be one of many effects of the underpinning biologi-
cal processes that cause organisms to age well or badly. Questions arise regarding
how the speciﬁc effects (such as signs of neurodegeneration), visible at the level of
the phenotype, are produced.
In the following extract a visiting molecular biologist, Mary, is presenting and
talking about her work on neurodegeneration and ADAD diseases with members
of the host laboratory (a small group of six people), which is part of a larger epi-
genetics group and that constitutes a “worm lab.” The nematode worm,
c. elegans, is the animal model that connects the work of the host and the
visitor, together with an interest in ageing and neurodegenerative processes. The
nematode worm is an experimental model in molecular biology because it shares
some basic biological mechanisms with many other species including the human
(an evolutionary effect known as “conservation”). In traveling from the mice to
the worm, we are traveling back in evolutionary time and while this might seem
reductionist it also means that what can be opened up for scrutiny are some of
the seeming “short-cuts” (Leibing 2016) being blackboxed in the reported exper-
iments with mice. Speciﬁcally, in what follows, what comes into view is how
genes do or do not get expressed (penetrate the phenotype) over the lifespan of
the animal and what the effects of these expressions mean in terms of the phenotype
and its neurobiological behavior.
Mary tells us that her research explores neurodegeneration and toxicity associ-
ated with TDP–43 (a protein that in humans is encoded by the TARDBP gene).
She says that TDP-43 effects different kinds of neurones and is associated with
different motor-neurone functions. In “diseased bodies” TDP-43 aggregates –
there is an absence of RNA that stabilizes and stops the TDP-43 from aggregating
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and forming clumps. She says that she has been working with a wild type (WT) of
nematode and a generated strain of TDP-43 expressing nematodes. This latter
worm is a homolog for human TDP-43. She says that TDP-43 worms lay 50%
less eggs, and only 60% of their eggs hatch (as opposed to 100% in the WT),
and that TDP-43 expression also affects ageing and lifespan with a decrease in
median lifespan. She says that she has been able to show that neurofunction is
also affected by TDP-43 expression. Speciﬁcally, motor function, measured by
counting the number of thrashes when the worm is stimulated, is affected by
TDP-43 expression: speciﬁcally, TDP-43 expressing worms thrash less than the
wild-type worms, and she shows a ﬁlm of worms thrashing at different rates.
She states that they also tested the worms crawling speed – she says you can
check their swimming speed but crawling speed is easier – the crawling speed is
slower in the TDP-43 expressing worms.
In the second experiment, the phenotypes between Wild Type and TDP-43
worms were synchronized at day 1 of their lifespan. This time Mary’s lab
checked for morphological differences (visual changes to the worms’ neurone)
ﬁrst – she reports that they did not see any differences. Then they tried pushing
the worms age to 5 days – so that they were looking at “aged worms” – to see if
there were any morphological differences in degeneration or death of neurones,
and they found that there were. They then checked mechanistic neurofunction
(as above) and this was reduced in TDP-43 expressing animals. Then they
asked: “are neurones defective in chemosensory functions?” The test used repellent
odorants and showed that avoidance response is reduced in TDP-43 expressing
animals – indicating that they had become less sensitive. In a rare moment when
the animal is attributed with some sense of mindedness Janice, the head of the
host laboratory, asks if they might be “clever” worms – “those worms who have
loss of sensory function might live longer?”Mary responds saying that on the con-
trary loss of olfactory function is linked to premature ageing and even death.
These experiments – like many being undertaken across the globe – are able to
track the relation between speciﬁc biomarkers – in this case, TDP-43 – neurodegen-
eration and the temporalities of complex biological processes that underpin these
associations. What these biologists are enacting is a way of opening up the com-
plexity of how genes work, particularly with respect to the protective mechanisms
involved in how genes and gene mutations control proteins including their aggre-
gation. Aggregation of proteins forms clumps, clumps are enacted as what kills
neurons to form atrophy. Speciﬁcally, in the comparison between transgenic and
wild type worms, as well as between worms of different ages, Mary shows how
mutations in the TARDBP gene coupled with changes over time (age) affect tran-
scription and how proteins are regulated and as a result of which the neurocognitive
function of the worms is disrupted. But what she is also enacting is plasticity and
variability over gene expression.
The problem for biomedicine is how to mobilize the experimental model of the
genetics of ADAD as a “spokesperson” (Latour 1987) for dementia in humans. On
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the one hand, there are problems over making the crossing between brain and mind
(Williams, Katz, and Martin 2011, 2012). It is this crossing that holds particular
challenges for modeling neurodegeneration, with many mice models showing
promise for treatment strategies that have proved to be ineffective in humans result-
ing in a “repository for frustrated hopes” (Milne 2016, 397). Critically, Mary makes
the crossing back to the human, not through reintroducing the minded subject but
by reminding her audience that the gene TDP-43 is associated with frontal-tem-
poral lobe dementia (FTD) in humans, that humans identiﬁed as having frontal–
temporal lobe dementia have been shown to express TDP-43 (see also Ling
et al. 2015). Mary thus enacts her research as opening up associations between
genes, mutations and how protective biological mechanisms work or do not –
and it is the protective mechanism at the biological level that seems to fail in
humans too in the production of the neurodegenerative condition called FTD.
This work overlaps with Johnson et al.’s (cited in Leibing 2016, 53) longitudinal
study of the genome of 2000 human individuals that showed that some individuals
have a genetic mutation that protects them from the amyloid build up with none of
those with this protective mutation suffering from AD, or cognitive decline. The
difference is, Mary’s work only takes a matter of weeks not “decades” to
achieve. But neither Johnson nor Mary are claiming that the genetic biomarkers
involved can simply be used as predictors of AD or FTD in humans. On the con-
trary, Mary is putting together a complex set of variables, including age, to suggest
that as the animal ages there are changes in the protective mechanisms that prevent
protein aggregation in worms that express TDP-43.
Post ﬁeld-work reﬂections
Before ending it is important to reﬂect further on the animal modeling that under-
pins laboratory attempts to stabilize biomarkers of different forms of ADAD that
can be used in early detection, and the paradigms that inform clinical diagnosis.
After setting the scene for why genetic biomarkers have become so important to
dementia science, we then discussed the disjuncture, as noted in the literature,
between the paradigms that inform clinical diagnosis and the animal modeling
that underpins laboratory attempts to stabilize genetic biomarkers of ADAD for
early detection. Speciﬁcally, pressure for early detection technologies has been cri-
tiqued by medical doctors as well as social scientists for their reduction of dementia
to biological mechanisms in ways that do not account for how minded and situated
personhood unfolds over time.
Following the section that introduced our three research sites, we ﬁrst presented
an analysis of clinical discourse and practice in memory clinics dedicated to the
early detection of dementia. Here we showed how genetic biomarkers of the pro-
blems patients are experiencing with memory and thinking are made absent.
Instead, for a diagnosis of dementia to hold it is the association between the
patient as a minded, social subject, situated in biography and milieu, and somatic
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evidence of dementia located in pathological changes to the brain, that stabilizes a
diagnosis of dementia. We then went on to illustrate how dementia science in
pursuit of possible routes to therapeutic interventions tests tau’s association with
AD, the most common form of dementia, by reinforcing the association of
genetic biomarkers with symptoms of dementia in mice. This process does not attri-
bute mice as either minded or situated so by default elides the minded, situated
subject upon which the clinic relies to ﬁrm up a diagnosis of dementia. Next, we
presented new research in the biosciences of ageing which focusses on epigenetic
biological processes, and which associates particular genetic processes with symp-
toms of neurodegeneration in nematode worms. This research presses the relation-
ship between gene expression and age (early and later in life), and makes some
attempt to situate the biology of dementia, but does not attribute worms with any
form of mindedness.
Both these laboratory studies attribute no mindedness to the animals they use,
rather neurological symptoms are conceived of as “behavior” and attributed to
what is hardwired cognition. This, of course, raises the problem of how to make
an animal or any other kind of model an analog for human mindedness, let alone
the inter-relational complexity of the mind, memory, and illness upon which mean-
ingful clinical work with people with neurological disease seem to depend.
However, in our shift to basic molecular neuroscience research what we showed
is that the laboratory-based enactments do not align with the straightforward
picture of biomarkers as predictors of dementia – the picture that is being optimis-
tically perpetuated in policy discourse.
While the same biomarkers are not necessarily in play in each domain, what
emerges in our study is how the clinic reﬁgures some of the “messiness” of
minded, located personhood that the laboratory cuts out, as at the same time as it
makes absent the messiness and uncertainty of the genomic underpinnings of
dementia that the laboratory includes. However, with the rise of epigenetics, it
seems that some of the “chaos of life” (De Beer 2013, 2) has been brought back
into the laboratory. In particular, scientists embed molecular processes of neurode-
generation in the speciﬁcities of the animals’ “biography” and “milieu” (Niewöhner
2011), not as minded subjects, but in relation to gene-environment interactions over
time.
In Mary’s research, as well as in the Max Plank work, genotype-phenotype
relations are being enacted as variable and plastic: AD can be reversed in worms
once the Human Tau-gene is neutralized, while TDP-43 expression changes with
age in nematodes. Questions arise as to whether research on the molecular basis
of ADADs disrupt understandings of neurodegeneration as necessarily having a
continuous, irreversible and inevitable trajectory, or even that ADAD are the
effects of mechanisms internal to an organism’s brain. In the research being under-
taken in the host Life Sciences institute in which Mary is giving her paper, what is
being focussed upon are variability and plasticity in how gene expression is
affected by the environment in which the animal is situated (their milieu) across
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the animal’s lifespan. For example, experiments were being conducted in which the
animals’ environments (in the form of food, heat and so on) were modiﬁed and
which explored the effects of this on the kind of molecular processes described
by Mary above. So not only one version of their “biography” (their genetic
origins and their life over time) but their milieu (their environment) entered into
the deliberations over the correlations between neurological effects and gene
expression.
Mary’s research is concerned with how the materialities of the world (bodies,
genes, environmental forces) interact and are co-constitutive of biological pro-
cesses – for example in the relationships between neurodegeneration, gene
expression and age. Does this shift represent the possibility that dementia could
move towards more situated biology? A shift that was hinted at in an interview
with another molecular biologist:
The human population is not under lab conditions, there is incredible variation in their
environmental exposures to things. There is a lot of genetic variation to begin with
and I think that they are coming against a degree of complexity that is really really
tough for them (bioscientists) to nail down and say “yes, this gene here is a determi-
nant of longevity in human populations.” I mean some of it has been published but I
think that they all feel a level of discomfort that they haven’t found big effects like we
ﬁnd in worms and ﬂies and I think the complexity of the environment, so this gets
back to you know, when we go “Ah ha there are genes that determine how long
animals live,” and we talk, we use this for determine, determine, determine, deter-
mine. That is all very well but we have got to take a step back and say “Yes it deter-
mines it in that very speciﬁc environment in the laboratory. Now if you broaden this
thing out to a number of different environments, diet, nutrition, stress, blah, blah, does
it still hold true that this gene determines lifespan?” I think that the answer is “No.”
Different genes under different circumstances, very complex picture of genes inter-
acting with environmental factors producing an ageing outcome. And it seems like
everywhere we look in the lab for things that could modulate ageing, so you know
early exposure to radiation, early exposure to stress, we see changes in lifespan all
the time and it makes you wonder why people weren’t working on this a 100
years ago. (US based biologist of ageing)
In this account, the biologist is pressing how biological processes affecting how
organisms age is relational, plastic and variable. It seems as if he is suggesting
that some of the “chaos of life” needs to be allowed to enter the laboratory. But
he, like Mary and our host Life Sciences Institute, conceives of the environment
almost entirely in terms of “natural” forces (Niewöhner 2011): the laboratory
animal has a biography of sorts (a genetically engineered biography perhaps)
and a milieu (as environment made up of natural forces), but unlike in the clinic
the animals being modeled are not enacted as minded subjects.
The shift towards more situated and temporal understandings of the processes
underpinning effects such as neurodegeneration resonates with a growing body
of literature that seeks to understand the implications of epigenetics as a more
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relational approach to genomics and genetic expression for understanding long-
term health and illness processes such as dementia (e.g. Müller and Samarasa
2018; Niewohner 2015; Palsson 2016; Pickersgill et al. 2013). In particular,
there is interest in whether the genome is being understood as highly sensitive
“to social inﬂuence,” including how “social regulation of gene expression is a
potent inﬂuence on behavior” (Robinson, Grozinger, and Whitﬁeld 2005, 258).
This shift towards situated biology, or even perhaps eventually a “biosocial
genome” (Müller et al. 2017) makes attempts to stabilize genetic biomarkers of pre-
clinical ADAD even more problematic. Speciﬁcally, where the laboratory science
seems to be moving towards conceiving of biological processes that underpin par-
ticular pathologies as located in gene-environment interactions across the lifespan
of the animal, including possibilities for variation, plasticity and even reversibility
of neurodegenerative effects, do genetic biomarkers as is the case in the clinic, need
to be treated as always provisional?
Concluding thoughts
Both inside and outside the laboratory, in biomedical and public health research
related to dementia, much is being invested in the hypothesis of pre-clinical demen-
tia and the establishment of biomarkers of a disease that takes years to develop into
a symptomatic illness. The pursuit of biomarkers that can indicate the presence of
neurodegenerative disease years ahead of someone’s experiencing any symptoms
of being ill, accords with contemporary forms of anticipatory (Adams, Murphy,
and Clarke 2009) or pre-emptive (Massumi 2007) biopolitics. But for our partici-
pants in clinical work, as well as in the science at the interface with the clinic, the
associations between these biomarkers and the symptoms of ADAD in humans
must also at moments be made to “hold.”
One of our aims has been to explore the disjuncture between the animal model-
ing that underpins laboratory attempts to stabilize genetic biomarkers of ADAD for
early detection and the paradigms that inform clinical diagnosis. Speciﬁcally, we
discussed how pressure for early detection technologies are critiqued by medical
doctors as well as social scientists for their reduction of dementia to biological
mechanisms in ways that do not account for how minded and situated personhood
unfolds over time. Our second aim has been, drawing on Niewöhner and Lock’s
recent work (2018), to explore the extent to which dementia is also enacted as rela-
tional, the effect of gene-environment interactions that unfold over time, thus
getting us beyond not just the constraints of genetic determinism, but also
beyond the constraints of too individuated a notion of mindedness as a biosocial
effect.
In this respect, we showed how the diagnostic process that we observed in the
clinic entails interactional work that associates, or not, diverse biomarkers with
patients’ and families’ accounts, in ways that bring us closer to an idea of a
minded dementia subject. This process does not use genetic biomarkers. Dementia
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is still located, however, in an individual brain, but that brain is enacted as belong-
ing to a speciﬁc and minded human subject. In the AD laboratory, we showed how
dementia is enacted as the effect of speciﬁc defective genes, associated with symp-
toms in mice – namely failures of behavior and cognitive function. Mice were not
however enacted as in anyway minded – “behavior” was being performed as
genetically determined and mechanistic. So the laboratory includes what the
clinic cuts out, while the clinic includes what the laboratory cuts out.
It is unsurprising that the translation of biomarkers varies across the clinic and
the laboratory. While the general uncertainty associated with biomarkers has
been noted (e.g. Metzler 2010), it is crystallised in dementia science in which diag-
nosis is complex, and the relationship between the biological and mindedness
“entangled” (Lock 2014). In the context of dementia laboratory research bio-
markers are problematic because of the problem of calibrating animal and
human disease (Milne 2019), while in the clinic biomarkers are contextualized
and their meaning contingent (see also Swallow 2019). Moreover, biomarkers in
ADAD, as this special issue explores, are doubly problematic because it is not
clear even what they are markers of, and how the processes that they mark relate
to the condition, its etiology and its unfolding. While existing attempts to “biomar-
kerize” (Metzler 2010) preclinical dementia are ongoing, their stabilization seems
to us to be failing from the perspective of clinical practice, which needs to situate
bodies and minds. It would also be useful for future research to consider what the
existence of symptomless patients who test positive for biomarkers mean for bio-
marker development.
We went on to show how in our third site of enactment, an epigenetics “worm”
laboratory concerned with the biology of ageing, neurodegenerative changes are
located in gene-environment interactions over time, and discussed how a shift to
epigenetics enacts the environment or “milieu,” as “natural” forces. We reﬂected
on whether such an enactment could bring us closer to a notion of “situated
biology” and possibilities for the biology of dementia to be understood as rela-
tional. This would also offer possibilities for biology to come a little closer to
understandings of mindedness and memory as also relational and situated (see e.g.
Brown and Reavey 2015).
We want to make an albeit speculative suggestion: working with animal models
to identify and understand the underpinning biology – genes, their expression and
how they regulate biological processes, such as aggregation – involved in produ-
cing the conditions underpinning neurodegeneration may make possible examin-
ation of the more situated and relational aspects of these processes. Rather than
ﬁrming up the grounds upon which biomarkers can become predictive of different
kinds of ADAD, animal model experiments in epigenetics seem to articulate gene
expression and its disruptive neurological effects in complex ways. Further social
science research could explore whether epigenetic experiments with animal models
ﬁrm up the speciﬁcity of biological processes underpinning neurodegeneration as
situated, plastic and variable. Of course, the minded subject is made absent in
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the laboratory but what is sometimes made present is that gene expression is not
pre-determined, and that the genotype-phenotype relation in ADAD is also rela-
tional, temporal and plastic.
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